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Executive Summary  
 
According to the 2011 census, the population of Bulgaria numbers 7,364,570 people. The two largest 
minorities in the country are Turks and Roma. Turks represent 8.8% of the population (588,318), 
while the share of Roma is 4.9% (325,343) according to the census. Experts believe that the real 
number of Roma could be twice as high. 
 
The debate about the political participation of Bulgarian minorities and especially about their allegedly 
disproportionately strong influence on the election results is among the most disputed and polarising 
issues in Bulgaria. Populist and nationalist political actors have periodically raised demands to limit 
the voting rights of Bulgarian minorities. Their intentions were partially realised in 2001 with the 
passing of the new Election Code.  
 
While introducing numerous positive changes and bringing some much needed clarity and order into 
the previously fragmented and confusing electoral legislation, the Code is highly controversial and has 
drawn criticism from international institutions, Bulgarian human rights watchdogs and other civic 
organisations, and some political actors. The most problematic issue is the six-months residency 
requirement for participation in local elections, which is an infringement on voting rights of numerous 
Bulgarian citizens. This restriction is aimed above all at the large community of people holding a dual 
Bulgarian and Turkish citizenship (estimated at up to 380,000). 
 
The new Election Code also tries to prevent or discourage some of the most notorious illegal and 
illegitimate practices that regularly accompany the elections in Bulgaria. One such practice is the so-
called vote buying – a process when people vote for a certain party or independent candidate in 
exchange for money or other type of bribe. Roma are most often accused that they sell their votes and 
in this way distort the election results. A 2009 survey has shown that 40% of Roma are prepared to 
vote for those who pay them. The measures are therefore disproportionally targeting the Roma 
community. The media reporting on alleged Roma vote selling also strongly contributes to the 
prevailingly negative public attitude towards Roma. 
 
The key question the following report therefore tries to answer is how the populist and nationalistic 
political agenda on voting rights of Bulgarian minorities influences the relations between different 
ethnic communities in Bulgaria. The debate on voting rights is an excellent catalyst for evaluating the 
attitudes towards minorities – ranging from extremely intolerant demands for full revoking of existing 
political and voting rights to calls for genuine acceptance and respect of diversity. 
 
The fieldwork was conducted between October 2011 and February 2012. It included both desk 
research and empirical fieldwork. The most important event that marked the period in which the 
fieldwork was conducted were the presidential and local elections, which took place in October 2011. 
 
During the fieldwork, 14 semi-standardised interviews were taken. The interview guide was divided 
into two main groups of questions. The first one focused on the new Election Code and its restriction 
of the voting rights of people with double citizenship. This topic very directly concerns the political 
representation of the Bulgarian Turks. The second topic centred on the so-called vote buying – a 
notorious practice which seems to spread with each successive elections. The issue is connected with 
the voting of the Roma community, as Roma are most often believed to participate in such schemes.  
 
The main part of the desk research consisted of collecting and analysing the media coverage of the 
main political challenge analysed in this report: the 2011 Election code and its consequences for the 
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voting rights of Bulgarian Turkish and Roma minorities. In addition, statistical data, legal texts, policy 
documents, and proceedings of the National Assembly and relevant parliamentary committees were 
also examined. 
 
One of the main findings of our research is that the changes introduced by the new Election Code have 
tainted the pre-election process and the election campaign. They also intensified the inter-ethnic 
distrust and confrontation.  
 
The research has shown that the declarative support for the democratic and tolerant arrangements 
where all Bulgarian citizens have equal political rights is quickly cast aside when it comes to the 
concrete cases concerning ethnic and religious otherness. The fact that Bulgarian Turks have been 
directly affected by the new Election Code has caused a barely concealed relief among the majority 
population, rather than an open indignation over the undemocratic arrangement. Such an attitude is an 
indication of a low level of tolerance towards the minorities and of immature civil consciousness of 
the society.  
 
Three main discourses on the state of inter-ethnic relations in Bulgaria can be identified: 
1) inter-ethnic relations are not on a downward curve, but follow a cyclical pattern – deterioration in 
the election period after which they return to normality; 
2) inter-ethnic relations are steadily deteriorating, not just because of the political games and 
manipulation, but because of the economic crisis and worsening standard of living 
3) not only inter-ethnic relations are worsening, but relations among all people in Bulgaria in general 
 
The notorious practice of vote buying and selling in not confined to Roma, as the popular stereotypes 
would have us believe. The October 2011 elections have shown that this malicious practice is 
spreading. As a result, the majority of the Bulgarian voters are becoming increasingly disillusioned 
and disappointed over the state of the Bulgarian political system and prefer not to vote at all, which is 
playing straight into the hands of the corrupt and dishonest economic-political actors. Despite that, the 
media and the public perceptions continue to attribute this malpractice to Roma, who are therefore 
accused that they influence the election results in an illegal and illegitimate way. 
  
The current research has again highlighted the significant discrepancy between the official political 
and public discourse on perception and application of democratic norms and values, and the reality. 
While the public speech is focused on notions of tolerance and acceptance, the concrete examples and 
everyday practices testify about entrenched intolerance that can be easily mobilised in the critical 
moments like political, social and economic crisis.  
 
Despite the fact that the central government periodically comes up with different programmes and 
strategies for integration of minorities, the practical implementation is either lacking or is flawed and 
inadequate. The research has shown that the regional solutions tailored to the ethnic, cultural and 
religious structure of the population on the local level can be far more successful than the solutions 
proposed on the national level. The largest problem is to find a way to transfer the functioning 
everyday tolerance from the local level into the national context, which continues to be dominated by 
intolerant stereotypes and prejudices. A larger regional and municipal autonomy to address the needs 
and problems of the local population according to its specific features would be a positive step in 
turning the unsuccessful top-down approach into a more appropriate two-way process. 
 
The research has also established that many people are either ignorant of or tend to disregard the 
numerous problems that could provoke or intensify tensions between different ethnic, cultural and 
religious groups. Forming and changing the collective matrix is a long and contradictory process. Our 
recommendation is to intensify the research of inter-ethnic relations – not just in Bulgarian context, 
but also in the European one. The disclosure of good practices and popularisation of results from 
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similar studies increase the sensitivity of the society for such topics. They also stimulate the 
willingness of state institutions to look for and implement more adequate and comprehensive policies. 
Keywords 
Political participation of minorities; Bulgarians; Turks; Roma; Bulgarian-Turkish dual citizens; vote 
buying; Election Code; populism and nationalism; voting rights; Movement for Rights and Freedoms; 




According to the 2011 census, the population of Bulgaria numbers 7,364,570 people. The two largest 
minorities in the country are Turks and Roma. Turks represent 8.8% of the population (588,318), 
while the share of Roma is 4.9% (325,343) according to the census. Experts believe that the real 
number of Roma could be twice as high. 
 
The debate about the political participation of Bulgarian minorities and especially about their allegedly 
disproportionately strong influence on the election results is among the most disputed and polarising 
issues in Bulgaria. In the pre-election periods, the debate usually becomes exceptionally hot, and quite 
frequently, populist and nationalist political actors raise demands aimed at limiting the voting rights of 
Bulgarian minorities. Needless to say, these demands are more often than not openly undemocratic, 
illiberal and intolerant.  
 
Against such social-political background, on 19 January 2011 the National Assembly of Bulgaria 
adopted the new Election Code. While introducing numerous positive changes and bringing some 
much needed clarity and order into previously fragmented and confusing electoral legislation, the 
Code is highly controversial and some of its articles have drawn criticism from international 
institutions, Bulgarian human rights watchdogs and other civic organisations, and some political 
actors.  
 
The 2011 Election Code is the first ever unified legislation act dealing with elections in Bulgaria. It 
substituted four different acts, which previously regulated different types of elections (Act on the 
Election of Members of Parliament, Act on the Election of President and Vice President, Act on the 
Election of Members of the European Parliament, and Local Elections Act). The first draft of the 
Election Code was vetoed by President Georgi Parvanov and returned to Parliament for 
reconsideration of its numerous articles. The most important complaints voiced by President Parvanov 
and supported by some opposition political parties and a part of the civil society included: the 12-
months residency requirement for participation in local elections; limitations on voting rights of 
citizens with dual citizenship; abolition of the direct election of district mayors; increased population 
threshold for the election of mayors of villages; and reduction of the number of municipal councillors.  
 
The presidential veto was eventually overridden by the majority in the National Assembly (more than 
half of all MPs need to vote for the law to override the President’s veto). As none of the demanded 
changes were made to the Code, the opposition parties approached the Constitutional Court. In its 
Decision no. 4/2011 from 4 May 2011, the Court ruled that several provisions of the Election Code 
were unconstitutional. Following the ruling, the National Assembly on 2 June adopted a series of 
amendments to the Code. Most notably, the requirement to live at least 12 months prior to the election 
day in a certain Bulgarian municipality to be eligible to vote in the local elections there was shortened 
to six months (four months for the October 2011 elections).  
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The attempts to limit the voting rights of entire groups of Bulgarian citizens did not alarm only the 
minority communities and the political parties, which represent their interests, but also the Bulgarian 
civil society and the international (especially EU) institutions. Although the nationalistic and 
xenophobic public dispositions, exploited by various political parties, have been on the rise across 
Europe over the recent years, the developments in Bulgaria are characterised by several features that 
make them rather unique in the European space.  
 
One aspect that makes Bulgaria exceptional is the large community of people holding a dual Bulgarian 
and Turkish citizenship. It is estimated that up to 380,000 people are at the same time citizens of one 
EU member and one non-member state. Another feature distinguishing Bulgaria from the majority of 
other EU countries is the sizeable Roma minority – according to expert estimates representing about 7-
8% of the population. 
 
Not surprisingly, even the most nationalistic and xenophobic political actors try to conceal their 
attempts to curtail the political participation of minorities by presenting them as measures aimed at 
fighting certain illegal and illegitimate practices that regularly accompany the elections in Bulgaria. 
One such practice is the so-called vote buying – a process when people vote for a certain party or 
independent candidate in exchange for money or other type of bribe. Roma are most often accused that 
they sell their votes and in this way they distort the election results by giving advantage to the most 
corrupt and unscrupulous political actors.   
 
Despite the consensus among all political parties that vote buying and similar schemes are 
unacceptable and that the legislation and practical organisation of election process need to change in a 
way that would limit or prevent them, the practice shows that virtually no party is immune to such 
temptation and the phenomenon has been growing from year to year and from elections to elections. 
Although the investigations conducted by civil society and independent observers show that the vote 
buying is not limited to the Roma community only, nor that the majority of Roma are ready and 
willing to sell their votes, the nationalistic parties have managed to force their agenda into the media 
and public debates. Both are saturated with extreme positions regarding the voting rights of Roma 
citizens and their ability to take an informed decision on the elections.  
 
Another contentious issue is the voting of Bulgarian Turks, who have emigrated to the Republic of 
Turkey and have a dual (Bulgarian and Turkish) citizenship. There is a strong position, shared by 
numerous political actors and a large part of the society, that despite being Bulgarian citizens, they 
should have no right to influence the Bulgarian politics because they do not live in the country. 
Periodically, various political parties have proposed and tried to implement different measures to limit 
their voting rights. Although the issue of voting rights of emigrants does not concern only the 
Bulgarian Turks, but also ethnic Bulgarians who have left the country since 1989, the debates focus on 
the Bulgarian emigrants of Turkish origin because the practice has shown that they are considerably 
more active and organised voters than the ethnic Bulgarians in emigration. The results from the last 
few elections show that between 50 and 60% of the votes cast abroad are for the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms (MRF), a political party representing the interests of Bulgarian Turks and other 
minority communities. The attempts to limit the voting rights of Bulgarian dual citizens therefore have 
a very practical goal – to decrease the electoral success of the MRF, widely perceived by other 
political actors and a significant share of the society as wielding a disproportionately large political 
and economic power in the country. 
 
 
The key question: 
The key question the following report tries to answer is how the populist and nationalistic political 
agenda on voting rights of Bulgarian minorities influences the relations between different ethnic 
communities in Bulgaria. The debate on voting rights can be an excellent catalyst for evaluating the 
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attitudes towards minorities – ranging from extremely intolerant demands for full revoking of existing 




The fieldwork was conducted between October 2011 and February 2012. It included both desk 
research and empirical fieldwork. The most important event that marked the period in which the 
fieldwork was conducted were the presidential and local elections, which took place on 23 October 
(the first round) and 30 October 2011 (the second round). 
 
During the fieldwork, 14 semi-standardised interviews were taken. The sample of respondents 
included representatives of all major ethnic and religious groups in Bulgaria – Orthodox Christian 
Bulgarians (7), Turks (4), Muslim Bulgarians (2) and Roma (1). In order to capture a wide range of 
different views and opinions, we interviewed several politicians (two members of the National 
Assembly of Bulgaria and six who hold or used to hold positions in local government). One 
respondent is a well-known political analyst and an expert on the topic of political participation of 
minorities. Five respondents are ordinary citizens with different professions and background. 
 
The elections had a decisive impact on the way the interviews were conducted. On the one hand, the 
overwhelming share of public debates and media coverage in the period from September to November 
dealt with the elections and political developments in Bulgaria, making our research topic about the 
voting rights of minorities highly relevant. All respondents were excited over the elections and eager 
to share their opinion. On the other hand, some of them (especially the local politicians who were 
personally involved in the election race) were emotionally affected by the elections and their outcome. 
It was very difficult for them to distance themselves from their personal experience and to concentrate 
on evaluating the issues in the national frame. 
 
Four people were interviewed in the capital Sofia. Three interviews were taken in two villages in 
central Bulgaria. Both villages have sizable Roma communities. Four interviews were made in an 
eastern Bulgarian town with the majority Turkish population – two respondents were ethnic 
Bulgarians and two were ethnic Turks. The remaining three interviews are from a village in south-
western Bulgaria, where the majority of residents are Muslim Bulgarians. Our sample thus roughly 
corresponds to the ethnic structure of the Bulgarian population. Inclusion of small settlements from 
various parts of the country is particularly important for the research, because the problems, relations, 
tendencies and perceptions there often significantly differ from those that can be noted in Sofia. 
 
The interview guide (see Annex 1) was divided into two main groups of questions. The first one 
focused on the new Election Code and its restriction of the voting rights of people with double 
citizenship. This topic very directly concerns the political representation of the Bulgarian Turks, as it 
is quite obvious that restrictions are aimed in the first place against people holding a dual Bulgarian-
Turkish citizenship. This issue also brings forward the question of how willing are Bulgarians to 
accept and respect the right to vote of those Bulgarian citizens who live outside the country – 
especially if they are of a minority origin. 
 
The second topic centred on the so-called vote buying – a notorious practice which seems to spread 
with each successive elections. The issue is connected with the voting of the Roma community, as 
Roma are most often believed to participate in such schemes. This group of questions examined the 
attitude of the society towards participation of Roma in the political and social processes in Bulgaria.  
 
All interviews were transcribed in Bulgarian. The audio files are stored in IMIR’s archive. Anonymity 
of all respondents is guaranteed. They were given assurances that their opinions will be used only for 
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the purpose of this research. The interviews were analysed with the method of discourse analysis, 
which considers the selection of strategies for providing answers, the way opinions are formulated, 
and the influence of the environment and circumstances in which the interview took place. The 
analysis is structured in a way that makes it possible to evaluate the levels of intolerance, tolerance and 
recognition. 
 
The main part of the desk research consisted of collecting and analysing the media coverage of the 
main political challenge analysed in this report: the 2011 Election code and its consequences for the 
voting rights of Bulgarian Turkish and Roma minorities. In addition, statistical data, legal texts, policy 
documents, and proceedings of the National Assembly and relevant parliamentary committees were 
also examined. 
 
For the media coverage, we have focused on Trud (or Labour; in Bulgarian Труд). Trud is the largest-
circulation Bulgarian daily newspaper (between 70,000 and 100,000). Established in 1936, it is also 
the oldest Bulgarian newspaper still in existence. According to public opinion poll, it is the most 
trusted daily newspaper. Its language and positions are predominantly conservative. It is considered 
politically neutral and usually critical of the government regardless of its colour. Using the “keyword” 
search through the Trud archive, we compiled three groups of articles around the following keywords: 
election tourism, vote buying and election code.  
The time period for articles on vote buying was October-November 2011 (roughly a month before and 
after the 2011 presidential and local elections). A month before the elections was the most active 
period for this illegal practice, while the month after the elections was marked by a number of police 
investigations and court proceedings against vote buyers and sellers. We opted for a longer period 
(January- November 2011) for articles on election tourism. Because of the new Election Code, which 
introduced the six-month residency requirement, the massive voter shifts did not occur few days 
before the elections (as was the case on previous elections). Instead, a new phenomenon was detected 
– large groups of voters changing their address registrations en masse during the first half of the 2011.  
Leaving out the articles shorter than 200 words, we analysed 21 articles on election tourism and 31 
articles on vote buying. Articles were coded and grouped according to the central topics they dealt 
with. The Critical Discourse Analysis was then used to reveal how the expressed opinions, implied 
meanings and used language are positioned within the frame “intolerance – tolerance – respect and 
recognition” regarding the voting rights of the Bulgarian minorities. 
3. Analysis of the political challenge: Voting of people holding a dual citizenship  
3. 1. Background information 
3. 1. 1. Historical background 
 
Turkish ethnic community is a traditional minority. Its roots go back to the period of the Ottoman rule 
over Bulgaria (1396-1878). After the establishment of the modern Bulgarian state in 1878, the status 
of Turks drastically changed – from the ruling elite to a minority in a state dominated by people of 
different ethnicity and religion. For over a century (until 1989), their position in the society and the 
attitude of the state and the majority population towards them were characterised by remarkable 
inconsistency. The periods of relative tolerance were followed by extreme repression and assimilation 
attempts. Even today, the majority of Turks live somewhat separated from the majority population – in 
compact areas in less developed rural regions. Despite that, their aspiration to participate in all aspects 
of social life has remained strong through the years. Hence, in addition to its cultural and intellectual 
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elite, the Turkish community formed also its political elite immediately after the end of the socialist 
period in 1989. 
 
Turks are a well-organised community, with high levels of inter-group support. The Muslim religion, 
different cultural traditions and ethnic origin are their main identity markers, which they have upheld 
and protected with consistency both during the periods of tolerance and repression (in the authoritarian 
past). For numerous Bulgarians, Turks are representatives of an alien ethnos that was hostile to 
Bulgarians in the past. At the same time, their participation in the cultural, social and political life in 
the country shows that Turks are dedicated and active citizens. The latent suspicions that they might 
harbour loyalty to another state (Turkey) often clash with the traditional stereotypes that Turks are 
hardworking, honest and overall – “non-problematic.” Bulgarians in general appreciate the efforts of 
Turks to be fully integrated in the society, and acknowledge that in most respects, there are hardly any 
differences in the way Turks and Bulgarians live. 
 
During the communist rule (1945-1989), the repressive state policies aimed at forced assimilation 
resulted in several waves of mass emigration of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey (1950-1951; 1968; 1989). 
After 1989, a large number of emigrants were able to regain the Bulgarian citizenship they have 
previously lost, and thus they became dual (Bulgarian and Turkish) citizens. This has eased their 
contacts with the relatives in Bulgaria, made it easier to visit their former homes more often and 
opened possibilities for starting a business in Bulgaria. In addition, the Bulgarian citizenship also 
enabled their participation in the political events in Bulgaria – giving them the right to vote. 
 
Among the numerous political parties formed after 1989 was also the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms (MRF) – a party mainly concerned with the protection of rights and interests of Muslims in 
Bulgaria. Turks and a significant share of Muslim Bulgarians recognised the MRF as their political 
representative on the national level. Over the years, the party became an important factor in the 
Bulgarian politics and participated in or provided a decisive support for several governments. The 
party has an exceptionally consolidated and organised structure and its activists and offices maintain 
close ties with the electorate not just in Bulgaria, but also in a number of cities in Turkey, where larger 
communities of immigrants from Bulgaria reside. Highly cohesive and active electorate means that the 
MRF can count on a very stable result on all elections – a sharp difference from almost all other 
political parties in Bulgaria, which have experienced notable shifts in their results in each consecutive 
election cycle. Although the MRF has never participated in the presidential elections with its own 
candidate, its support for a given candidate is traditionally decisive for winning the elections.1 
3. 1. 2. Legal and political context 
 
The Bulgarian citizens holding also a citizenship of another country face no restrictions related to their 
residency on the parliamentary and presidential elections. The situation is different regarding the local 
elections and elections for the European Parliament. The Article 3 (2) of the Election Code states that 
those Bulgarian citizens, who have lived at least three months prior to the election day in Bulgaria or 
in another EU member state, are eligible to cast their vote for the members of the European 
Parliament. The right to vote on the local elections is defined by the Article 3 (4) – only those 
Bulgarian citizens who have lived at least six months prior to the election day in a certain Bulgarian 
municipality have the right to vote for the mayor and municipal council of that municipality. 
                                                     
1
 The recent presidential elections (October 2011) were a prominent exception, as the MRF supported the candidate of the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party Ivaylo Kalfin against the winner Rosen Plevneliev of GERB. Although the majority of ethnic 
Turks supported Kalfin (according to the Institute of Social Surveys and Marketing, the exit polls showed that 71% of 
Turkish voters voted for Kalfin against 29% for Plevneliev), it seems that many preferred to stay at home and not vote at 
all. Cvetan Cvetanov, Minister of Interior and the head of GERB’s election campaign team, stated after the first results 
were published, that “for the first time, a President was elected without the broker MRF” (Novinar, 2010). 
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Exceptionally, as the Code was passed in the election year, the residency requirement for the 2011 
municipal elections was reduced from 6 to 4 months. 
 
Practically all debates on the issue of voting rights of dual citizens focus on the case of Bulgarian 
Turks with the dual Bulgarian-Turkish citizenship. On the one hand, there is a historical distrust 
towards the former imperial hegemon and the Bulgarian Turkish emigrants are often perceived as a 
potential fifth column of the Turkish Republic. On the other hand, the Bulgarian-Turkish voters have 
over the past 20 years overwhelmingly supported the Movement for Rights and Freedoms – a fact 
upsetting not only the MRF’s political rivals, but a significant share of (ethnic Bulgarian) society.  
 
On the June 2001 parliamentary elections, out of 50,000 votes cast in Turkey, the MRF received 
38,840 votes (Özgür-Baklacioglu, 2006, p. 328). On the 2005 general elections, 53.99% of all who 
have voted abroad (77,020) supported the MRF (the party received 12.81% on the national scale). On 
the 2009 elections, when the number of voters abroad was more than double compared to 2005, the 
result was even more astonishing: the MRF collected 61.18% of votes abroad, while altogether its 
result on the national scale was 14.45%. From another point of view, from 610,521 votes the MRF 
received in 2009, 93,926 came from the voting sections abroad (see CEC, 2005; CEC, 2009). The 
number of Turkish-speaking Bulgarian citizens living in Turkey is estimated to be around 1,175,000. 
Different authors give different figures about the number of people with dual Bulgarian-Turkish 
citizenship. The highest estimate is around 380,000 people (Özgür-Baklacioglu, 2006, p. 322; Smilov 
and Jileva, 2010, p. 19). In any case, this is a group that has a considerable electoral potential (the 
number of voters registered for the October 2011 local elections was around 6,518,000; see 
OSCE/ODIHR, 2011a, p. 4).  
3. 1. 3. Attempts to limit the voting rights of Bulgarian-Turkish dual citizens 
 
In the 1990s, the question about the voting rights of Bulgarian Turks with dual citizenship was not 
problematic. This was partially a result of the desire to accommodate the Turkish minority and “make 
up” for the repressive assimilation policies of the communist regime. In the second half of the decade, 
Bulgaria also went through a deep political and economic crisis (1996-1997), which sidelined the 
question about the political participation of Bulgarian Turks. 
 
In the first decade of the 2000s, the left-right bipolar model of the 1990s was shattered by the rise of 
the populist parties, such as the National Movement Simeon II in 2001, GERB – Citizens for European 
Development of Bulgaria in 2006, and also the extreme nationalist party Attack in 2005. In this 
situation, the voting rights of Bulgarian citizens residing in Turkey came under fire. In December 
2006, the party Attack proposed amendments to the Law on Bulgarian Citizenship. Amendments 
would eliminate the dual citizenship, with the exception of citizens of Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, 
Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, who are of ethnic Bulgarian origin and who would have the right to 
obtain Bulgarian citizenship “to protect their rights and economic interest” (see Siderov, 2006). The 
amendments were rejected by the Parliament (19 votes ‘for,’ 78 ‘against,’ 26 abstentions) (News.bg, 
2007).2  
                                                     
2
  Attack has again sent a bill with their amendments into the parliamentary procedure in July 2011. Before the reading in the 
National Assembly, the bill needs to be reviewed and discussed by the relevant parliamentary committees – in this case 
the Legal Affairs Committee and the Human Rights, Religion, Citizens’ Complaints and Petitions Committee. The Legal 
Affairs Committee examined the bill in September 2011. Of 26 members of the Committee, 2 voted to support the 
amendments, 3 were against, while 15 abstained. The Committee therefore recommended the National Assembly not to 
support the bill on the first reading (Legal Affairs Committee,  2011). Large number of abstentions, however, most likely 
means that the majority of committee members did not want to openly support such a discriminatory bill, but were 
personally inclined to agree with Attack’s argumentation.  
In January 2012, the bill was discussed also by the Parliamentary Human Rights, Religion, Citizens’ Complaints and 
Petitions Committee. Attack’s deputy chairman Pavel Shopov underlined that the holders of dual citizenship have only 
rights but no obligations towards the Bulgarian state and that in this way, they are in a privileged position compared to 
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The demands to limit the voting rights of Turkish-Bulgarian dual citizens intensified prior to the first 
elections for the European Parliament in Bulgaria in May 2007. The opposition parties demanded the 
introduction of residence requirements that would disqualify voters residing in non-EU countries 
(especially Turkey). The proposal had also an overwhelming public support according to the public 
opinion poll conducted by the Alpha Research Agency. 65% of respondents supported the introduction 
of residence requirements for the EP elections. 70% of respondents were in favour of introduction of 
such requirement for all elections, while only 24.8% believed that such measures were discriminatory 
(Alpha Research, 2007). During the heated parliamentary debate on 8 February 2007, the opposition 
raised the argument that MEPs elected by the voters residing in Turkey would represent Turkey rather 
than Bulgaria in the EP. After the proposal was rejected by the majority, Ivan Kostov (leader of 
Democrats for Strong Bulgaria) called all deputies who did not support “this shameful trade-off” to 
walk out. Following his address, all deputies from opposition parties (Union of Democratic Forces, 
Democrats for Strong Bulgaria, Attack and Bulgarian National Union) left the plenary hall (National 
Assembly, 2007). The ruling coalition (Bulgarian Socialist Party, National Movement Simeon II, 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms) ultimately passed the legislation, which gave all Bulgarian 
citizens the right to vote regardless of where they live. 
 
In 2009, when two elections were held (in June for the European Parliament and in July for the 
National Assembly3), the populist and nationalist parties strengthened their resolve to find a way to 
prevent the Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin residing abroad from participation on the elections. 
The convincing victory of the populist-conservative GERB party in 2009 elections and their 
comfortable parliamentary majority provided by the support of the Attack led to the inevitable: the 
Election Code passed in January 2011 and amended in June introduced the six months residency 
requirement for the local elections.  
3. 1. 4. “Election tourism” and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
 
The mechanism through which the MRF is able to secure a relatively stable and predictable number of 
votes on all elections is popularly known as “election tourism.” Large groups of voters residing in 
Turkey are organised and transported to their native towns and villages in Bulgaria to cast their votes. 
Thus, they often directly determine the outcome of the elections – especially in smaller towns and 
villages, where literally every vote counts and can decide who is elected as a village or municipal 
mayor, or a municipal councillor.  
 
The unique position of the MRF – its unchallenged authority in numerous Bulgarian municipalities 
with the majority Muslim population – has in time increased its exposure to corrupt schemes and 
practices, and the party is today widely perceived (especially by its political opponents, media and 
political analysts) as the most corrupt political party in the country.4 Another development provoking 
(Contd.)                                                                  
other Bulgarian citizens. Speaking very explicitly about the Bulgarian-Turkish dual citizens, Shopov described them as “a 
huge mass of people who are not Europeans, do not accept European values, do not live according to the EU rules and 
actually reside on another continent.” Hundreds of thousands of such people use Bulgaria as a Trojan horse to have 
access to the EU, according to Shopov. Several members of the Committee objected to his remarks. The bill with 
amendments was flatly rejected (9 votes against, 2 abstentions, none for) (Human Rights, Religion, Citizens’ Complaints 
and Petitions Committee, 2012).  
3
 As mentioned above, the MRF collected 61.18% of votes from abroad on the national elections. 
4
 According to a public opinion research from 2008, 41.4% of respondents believe that “MPs, ministers and other MRF 
representatives in central and local government are very corrupt,” the same share (41.4%) neither agrees nor disagrees 
with such statement, while 17.2% disagree (Dimitrova, 2008). A political analyst Ognyan Minchev describes the MRF as 
“centralized, monopolistic ethnic corporation, which conducts slow, persistent and aggressive strategy for isolating 
ethnically mixed regions in Bulgaria under its hegemony and control.” In his view, “the massive political corruption (...) 
of the leaders and the activists of the MRF is unapproachable, solidly entrenched behind the monopolistic control, far 
from public scrutiny on the mechanisms of governance” (Minchev, 2005). In a recent interview, Prime Minister Boyko 
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negative dispositions towards the MRF is the ever growing political and economic influence of its 
perpetual leader Ahmed Dogan, who has headed the party since its establishment in 1990.5  
 
In recent years, the resentment over the MRF among the majority population has spilled over into a 
negative attitude towards Turks in general. The discontent over the MRF thus interacted with the 
traditional stereotypes and prejudices against Turks, resulting in the growing intolerance towards this 
minority. 
 
The solid grip of the MRF over its electorate is also a consequence of the fact that most other political 
parties largely neglect the Turkish minority. They rarely conduct election campaigns in regions 
populated by Muslims, do not try to win their support and rarely address issues, which are of main 
concern of these communities. Most parties view the “minority regions” as “bastions of the MRF” and 
prefer to concentrate their resources and attention elsewhere. Instead of finding ways to attract the 
potential MRF voters, other parties prefer to look for ways to administratively limit the influence of 
the MRF. The restriction of the right to vote on the local elections only to the people who have 
permanently resided in a given municipality for at least six months prior to the election day is the 
latest and bluntest such attempt. 
3. 2. The media analysis 
 
The daily Trud featured 21 articles mentioning election tourism in January-November 2011 period. 
Six articles (all from the February-May period) were devoted to the new Election Code and 
specifically its possible consequences for the election tourism. As this was the period between the 
passing of the first version of the Code (with 12 month residency requirement) and the ruling of the 
Constitutional Court, after which the Code was amended and the requirement for permanent address in 
a given municipality shortened to six months, most articles discussed pros and cons of longer and 
shorter residency requirement. Articles underlined that the 12-month requirement was unusual for the 
EU countries and was even in violation of various international agreements Bulgaria has signed.  
 
Four articles (from October and November) analysed the elections and performance of the political 
parties. In general, the articles were very critical of the elections and stressed that the October 2011 
elections were the most poorly organised and implemented elections since 1989. A large share of the 
blame was assigned to the Election Code, which has created a legal chaos. Analysing the performance 
of the political parties, articles noted the poorer performance of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms (compared to the previous elections). Although the obstacles and limitations to electoral 
tourism (especially the fact that it was no longer possible to bring buses of voters from Turkey on or 
prior to the election day) were listed among the reasons for the lower result, other factors were named 
as more important. They included internal frictions in the party, resulting in the appearance of several 
splinter groups; a sharp decline in the popularity of nationalistic Attack party, which previously acted 
as a threat mobilising the minority voters; and the fact that the MRF is not anymore a convenient 
“shortcut” to the state financing it used to be when it was a part of the governing coalition in the 2001-
2009 period. The restrictions introduced by the Code were therefore evaluated as largely irrelevant for 
the MRF’s result and were instead criticised for preventing numerous eligible voters to exercise their 
right to vote due to confusion they have created. 
 
Half of the articles on election tourism reported on actual cases of false address registrations, 
investigated by the police and judiciary. A number of municipal officials (including mayors) were 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Borisov referred to the MRF as “the conductor of corruption in Bulgaria” (Novinar, 2011). For links between the MRF 
and corruption, see also Koritarov, 2008. 
5
 Ahead of 2009 general elections, Dogan has described himself as “the instrument of power, who distributes the bits of 
financing in the state.” He added that the power was concentrated in him, and not in the MRF’s deputies in the Parliament 
(Sofia Echo, 2009). 
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investigated and in some cases arrested for administratively “increasing” the number of eligible voters 
in their municipality, town or village by issuing false address registrations to groups of people. In one 
of the more notorious cases, a town of Madzharovo with 1500 residents acquired 140 new residents 
just a few days before the expiry of the deadline for election residency requirement. Practically all 
articles on unlawful address registrations tendentiously mentioned that the “new residents” either had 
“predominantly Turkish names” or that they actually resided in the “nearby Roma neighbourhood.”  
 
Despite the conscious attempt of the Trud editorial board not to cross the boundaries of political 
correctness and intolerant speech, the commentaries and especially the questions asked in various 
interviews implicitly brought forth the stereotypes and intolerant predispositions towards the 
minorities. This was most evident in the question whether the residency requirement would finally put 
an end to the buses bringing voters from Turkey to cast their ballots in various Bulgarian towns and 
villages. In general, in the majority of articles where the issue of election tourism was discussed in 
principle, the practice was almost exclusively linked to the MRF. Those articles which reported on the 
concrete cases of election tourism and false address registrations of voters, however clearly showed 
that this practice was employed by politicians from almost all political parties.  
 
3. 3. Fieldwork analysis – views of the respondents 
3. 3. 1. Attitudes towards political participation of the Turkish minority 
 
The changes to the Election Code, which in practice limit the voting rights of numerous Bulgarian 
citizens, bring forward two problematic issues. The first is the fact that the new Code limits or revokes 
the hitherto existing rights. The second one is the predominantly intolerant position of the majority 
population regarding the right of the Turkish minority to participate in the political processes in 
Bulgaria.  
 
When speaking about the voting rights of citizens in general, practically all respondents defend the 
opinion that these rights should not be restricted in any way. The new Election Code and especially the 
obligation to reside in the given municipality for at least six months to be eligible for voting on the 
local elections is seen as problematic. It seems that most respondents regardless of their ethnic and 
religious origin support the view of Remzi Osman (deputy-chief of the parliamentary group of the 
MRF) that according to the Constitution, all Bulgarian citizens have equal rights and obligations 
regardless of where they live. The conditioning of their voting rights with their permanent residence 
would therefore be unconstitutional and undemocratic (Apostolova, 2010).  
“There is a problem with democracy here. Citizens of one country should not be prevented from 
voting. Voting right should not depend on whether the person lived for a certain period of time 
in the country or not.” – A-WP4-4 
 
However, this tolerant and liberal discourse prevails only as long as the discussion remains generalised 
and the minorities are not specifically mentioned. The general defence of civic rights can quickly turn 
into something completely different when the question is narrowed down to the rights of the Bulgarian 
Turks. 
“It is a bit different with Turks. First, many of them left Bulgaria during the Revival Process6 
and perhaps there is some revanchism involved on their side. I suspect that the reason for the 
enormous support for the MRF is exactly this. They think that by voting for their own people 
they get some kind of payback, but I’m not 100% certain that this is so.” – A-WP4-4  
 
                                                     
6
 The process of forced assimilation of Bulgarian Muslim minorities undertaken by the Bulgarian communist regime. The 
Bulgarian Muslims were forced to change their names, and their language, religion and traditions were prohibited. 
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The traditional suspicions towards the Bulgarian Turks are strengthened by the resentment over the 
perception that for the larger part of the post-socialist period, the MRF has played a disproportionally 
significant role in the Bulgarian political life owing to the votes coming from Turkey. Ethnic 
Bulgarian respondents are therefore quick to draw limits to their tolerant understanding that all 
Bulgarian citizens are entitled to the same rights. Many see the mass participation of voters from 
Turkey as something intolerable.  
 
The Turkish respondents are somewhat surprisingly divided on the issue. The two members of the 
National Assembly are very critical of the Election Code and have little doubt that restrictions are 
targeting above all the voters residing in Turkey: 
“In my opinion, some things were introduced on purpose to prevent certain minorities, and 
mainly their representatives who live across the border, from freely exercising their right to 
vote.” – A-WP4-3 
 
On the other hand, Turkish respondents from a municipality where Turks represent the majority 
population and who have been directly affected by the practice of “election tourism” display opinions, 
which are quite close to the discourse of ethnic Bulgarians. The obvious influence (often so strong to 
play a decisive role) of the “travelling voters” on the local elections is causing discomfort and even 
annoyance among many Turks residing in Bulgaria.  
“This what they did with the travelling (of voters from Turkey) was not good. You cannot just 
come here and change everything. To live in another country and then suddenly to decide who 
you want (to be elected here). And then he goes back, but we stay here. In a small municipality, 
this makes the difference. They change the vote, everything.” – A-WP4-11  
“There are people among them I talked to, who are interested in what is happening in Bulgaria. 
I would accept that they vote for the president, but not on the local elections. They don’t pay 
taxes. They are not interested in this. If in a large city like Sofia three buses arrive, it will not 
even be noticed. But in a small village, three voters can turn the elections around.” – A-WP4-10 
 
It is interesting to note that the ethnic Bulgarian respondents from the same municipality express a 
more cautious opinion. They feel it is less damaging to tolerate the continuation of election tourism 
than to discriminate against different voters and restrict their rights.  
“On the one hand, I like this (the changes in the new Code), on the other hand I don’t. I like it 
because for many years, we have to live with the consequences of election tourism. On the other 
hand, in this way we deprive from voting also people, who are concerned about the development 
of the country, but are now unable to cast their votes.” – A-WP4-9  
 
The way such opinions are formulated and communicated implicitly indicates that a certain measure of 
auto-censorship is present. The ethnic Bulgarians who live in regions where they are an actual local 
minority often tend to express themselves in a more cautious way. Their aspiration to be politically 
correct and to avoid confrontations reveals that they are, or feel that they are, in a subordinated 
position – especially in terms of professional development and political participation. Only towards 
the end of the interview, or in informal talk after the interview, they openly state their grievances that 
the state and the main political parties are not interested in the problems of Bulgarians living in 
regions where the ethnic Turks are a majority. Most often, their complaints refer to employment 
problems and difficulties in communication with the municipal institutions, which are as a rule 
dominated by the MRF. 
 
In general, respondents try to provide a balanced comment on the restrictions imposed by the new 
Election Code. They acknowledge that all Bulgarian citizens have equal political rights, which should 
be respected without any hindrance. At the same time, they experience a certain sense of relief over 
the fact that people living abroad will have a lesser influence on the political developments in their 
municipalities. Such a dual attitude is an indication of a low level of tolerance towards the minorities 
and of the immature civil consciousness of the society. The declarative support for the democratic and 
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tolerant arrangements is quickly cast aside when it comes to the concrete cases concerning ethnic and 
religious otherness. In our case study, this is manifested in support for the restriction of the voting 
rights. The fact that Bulgarian Turks have been directly affected by the new Election Code has caused 
a barely concealed relief among the majority population, rather than an open indignation. 
3. 3. 2. Elections and their influence of the inter-ethnic relations 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, the changes introduced by the new Election Code have tainted the pre-
election process and the election campaign. They also intensified the inter-ethnic distrust and 
confrontation. The MRF party, faced with the risk of losing a significant number of its voters, started 
to look for alternative ways to preserve its positions in the regions under its “control.” Our respondents 
from these regions, including the ethnic Turks not affiliated with the MRF, said that they have noticed 
a substantial intensification of different schemes for manipulation of the election results. According to 
their testimonies, the illegal practice of vote buying has risen to unprecedented levels, as did the 
pressure on people to vote for certain candidates.  
 
In some cases, the pressure was exercised through clientelist networks, while in others it bordered on 
blunt extortion as people were given “hints” that there would be repercussions (employment problems, 
administrative obstacles, social isolation) if they voted for the “wrong” candidate. It has to be noted 
that in small villages, it is practically impossible to protect the secrecy of the ballot. 
 
Two Turkish respondents described concrete practices and mechanisms of election manipulations: 
“The politics (political parties) brings in the money. They give the money (in the proper places) 
and this changes everything, it changes people. One party decides everything, just like it was 
during the communism. If you don’t vote, there is no work for you, no nothing. Whether you 
want it or not – out of fear, you know, people would do anything.” – A-WP4-11  
“I owe the local shop-keeper 400 leva (200 EUR), but I’m an influential person in my village. 
People take my opinion into consideration. So they (the people working for the party) pay my 
debt and I start talking to my neighbours. I don’t force them – they trust my opinion and at some 
point, it turns out that I changed their way of thinking, because my debt was paid.” – A-WP4-10  
 
The two MPs add another, more conceptual dimension to the explanation why it is possible to 
manipulate and control the votes in the minority populated regions: 
“The vote is controlled through a complete fusion of political and administrative positions. 
When you add the economic pressure, then (the situation) really moves far away from the free 
choice.” – A-WP4-3 
“(In these) regions there is no trust in the state, in the institutions.” – A-WP4-2  
 
The trust in the state institutions and the political system is in Bulgaria exceptionally low in general.7 
In the regions where the MRF has been unchallenged and unchangeable political and economic 
hegemon, the trust in the institutions and the belief that anything can change are even lower. In such 
conditions, the anxiety and insecurity within the Turkish community can be and indeed were notably 
exploited during the last elections. According to some respondents, the MRF party was intentionally 
fuelling the fears and anxieties: 
“I thought that we have left the Revival Process in the past, but in fact it is artificially 
maintained. I don’t think that these things (fear that Revival Process could be repeated) are 
passed down in the families. I believe other factors are involved, which abuse (this issue) at the 
moment.” – A-WP4-9  
                                                     
7
 According to Eurobarometer 71 - Spring 2009, only 17% of Bulgarians trust their government, 10% trust the Bulgarian 
Parliament, and 14% trust the national judiciary (See European Commission, 2009, p. 20). 
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“What caught my attention was that right ahead of the elections, the MRF’s youth organisation 
was distributing books containing testimonies about the Revival Process.” – A-WP4-8 
“21st century, we are members of the EU and NATO, and they talk about changing of the names 
and demolition of mosques.” – A-WP4-2  
“This is the easiest way – to scare and manipulate people this way.” – A-WP4-3  
“And at some point they started with this: ‘Don’t you know what they will do? They will crush 
us. They will close our mosques.’ And an ordinary man believes that this could really happen, 
and he goes and votes.” – A-WP4-10 
 
The fact that such tactics and strategies can be successfully applied is a very straightforward indication 
of how strong are the deeply entrenched antagonisms and suspicions in the relations between the 
majority and minorities in Bulgaria. These embedded stereotypes have not been modified neither by 
the processes of democratisation and Europeanization, nor by the participation of Turks in the nation’s 
political and social life. The feelings of insecurity and tension obviously continue to run strong in the 
everyday life of the Turkish minority and they can be easily manipulated in a situation like the election 
period.  
 
Three main discourses on the state of inter-ethnic relations in Bulgaria can be identified in the 
interviews: 
1) inter-ethnic relations are not on a downward curve, but follow a cyclical pattern – deterioration in 
the election period after which they return to normality; 
2) inter-ethnic relations are steadily deteriorating, not just because of the political games and 
manipulation, but because of the economic crisis and worsening standard of living 
3) not only the inter-ethnic relations are worsening, but relations among all people in Bulgaria in 
general 
 
1) Cyclical pattern:  
Perceptions of people about the developments and experiences from their daily lives are often 
expressed in a very emotional tone. This strengthens the impression that the situation regarding the 
acceptance of otherness is worsening with an alarming pace. Some respondents disagree and say that 
there is no cause for alarm: 
“The divisions and alienation are not increasing – they are just hardened and reproduced.” – A-
WP4-1 
“Changes happen, but only during the elections, afterwards they are gone. (What happened 
during the elections) is not typical for the relations among people who live there.” – A-WP4-9 
“The bad thing is that they (the instigators) have started to come to our region. We never had 
them here before… Some Turks came to visit me, 70-80 years old, and they cry. They say – this 
can’t be happening, my boy, we are not all like that.” – A-WP4-8 
 
The inter-ethnic tensions thus come to the fore in critical moments, but this is rather an exception than 
the rule. Even when such processes are in their most active phase, not all people yield to the 
manipulation.  
 
2) Steady down-bound slide: 
The events and debates that dominated the public space before and after the October 2011 elections 
clearly show that the official discourse on equality and acceptance remains only on surface. Beneath 
the politically correct plaster, antagonisms and non-acceptance remain the thin red line of inter-ethnic 
and inter-religious relations in Bulgaria. It seems that the prolonged participation of the MRF in the 
Bulgarian politics did not manage to bring the two communities closer, but exactly the opposite – the 
MRF is one of the main reasons for the deepening intolerant dispositions towards Turks among the 
majority population. 
“When I started to work on the (Black Sea) coast, and people realized that I was a Turk... their 
attitude was a bit strange before they get to know what kind of person I am. They think that 
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Turks are not good people, but when we got to know each other, things changed. They told me 
afterwards that they have heard that Turks were bad….” – A-WP4-11 
 
These unfavourable tendencies are strengthened also by the current economic crisis and the 
exacerbated situation in which many people live. 
“Undoubtedly the negative attitudes and divisions are intensifying. The economic situation also 
contributes to this. I’m even afraid that at some moment, it can actually get much worse. In the 
situation of economic deficiency, the nationalistic passions can be easily provoked.” – A-WP4-4 
 
This testifies that the tolerance in the Bulgarian society is at a rather low level – both in the majority 
population and among the minorities. Otherness is accepted only on the declarative level, which is by 
no means conducive to inter-ethnic trust. The reaction to the ambivalent (to say the least) attitude of 
the majority towards the minorities is the corresponding position of the minority communities. 
Burdened by the heritage of past repression and hardships, and facing prejudice and negative reactions 
in their daily lives, the minorities harbour no illusions about the tolerant attitude of the majority. These 




3) Trust no one:  
Some respondents who talk about the aggravated relations between people stress that this is not 
happening only among the ones belonging to different ethnic and religious communities, but also 
among the people from the same group. 
“But after the last elections I see that the distrust has intensified. Now there is distrust even 
among our own people (Turks). Now you consider what you do and say even in front of your 
relatives, your cousins.” – A-WP4-11 
 
On a more positive note, we can mention an example of a municipality populated by Muslim 
Bulgarians (who are the local majority), Christian Bulgarians, Roma and Turks. The mayor and the 
municipal council have made a deliberate effort over the years to work for equality of all religious and 
ethnic groups. As a result, the respondents from the municipality did not talk about antagonisms and 
inter-ethnic problems, and it seems that worrying developments noted in a large part of the country 
remain alien to this ethnically and religiously very diverse municipality. This shows that despite the 
enduring stereotypes, the ethno-religious divisions and conflicts are not something ingrained in 
Bulgaria, but are above all a tool employed by unscrupulous political actors to gain or preserve their 
hold on power. 
 
Conclusion: 
Our preliminary hypothesis that the new Election Code and especially the restrictions on voting rights 
of some Bulgarian citizens will provoke significant outrage was not confirmed during the fieldwork. 
Most surprising was the fact that (with the notable exceptions of the two MPs) even the respondents 
from the Turkish community (which was directly targeted by the restrictions in the Code) were not 
particularly affected by the issue and rather tried to rationalise or even defend this obvious 
infringement of civic rights. Other respondents, especially those belonging to the majority population, 
demonstrated a cautious approval of the restrictive measures. This can be interpreted as a sign that the 
society is generally not well disposed towards respect and recognition of others, but that the dominant 
tendency is to support political and legal measures of exclusion and intolerance. 
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4. Analysis of the political challenge: Voting rights of the Roma minority 
4. 1. Background information 
 
Roma are also a traditional minority in Bulgaria, but unlike Turks, they are neither consolidated, nor 
very active in the political and public life. The community is divided into numerous sub-groups, and 
the relations between them are most often less than cordial. The main differences between these 
subgroups are linguistic, cultural and religious. The most important problem of the Roma community 
is the extreme poverty, combined with the exceptionally low level of education and fast growing 
illiteracy rates. The main reasons for the alarmingly high dropout rates of Roma children are (beside 
poverty) lack of family support for education, the need to work at an very early age both at home and 
outside home, unfriendly environment Roma children are often exposed to in schools (which are often 
perceived as threatening and restraining institutions), and early marriages and early pregnancies 
(Tilkidzhiev et al, 2009, pp. 67-82). 
 
Unlike Turks, who overwhelmingly vote for the MRF, the Roma community has never unified behind 
a single Roma party. Despite having the numerical potential to send such a party into the National 
Assembly, the Roma votes are usually highly fragmented (by 2005, there have been 26 registered 
Roma political parties in the country). Additionally, Roma voters display a low interest in the politics 
and usually fail to rally behind even the most ambitious and well-organised political campaigns of the 
Roma political parties. Only two Roma parties (Euro-Roma and Political Party Roma) have managed 
to win a seat or two in the National Assembly in different parliamentary terms. However, this has 
never happened when they participated on the elections on their own, but were awarded a seat as 
members of a coalition headed by a larger national party (Hajdinjak, 2008, pp. 119-121).  
4. 2. Vote buying and Roma 
 
Most of the elections that took place in Bulgaria over the past decade have been marred by the 
extensive vote buying and similar manipulations. The Roma community is considered particularly 
vulnerable to possible malpractices. Media and different observers have witnessed and in some cases 
documented a number of instances when brokers, “armed” with lists of names, addresses and personal 
identity numbers, were offering votes for sale in impoverished Roma neighbourhoods (Leviev-
Sawyer, 2011). A survey conducted by the National Centre for the Study of Public Opinion showed 
that vote buying is considered the most widespread and troubling type of election violations (36.6%). 
Further 52.8% said that the main flaw of the existing election legislation is that it makes the vote 
buying possible (NCSPO, 2010).  
 
Another NCSPO survey, conducted in 2009, showed that 40% of Roma are prepared to vote for those 
who pay them. In comparison, among all Bulgarian citizens regardless of ethnic origin, 12% are 
willing to sell their vote (Vesti, 2009). A more recent survey by Transparency International Bulgaria 
confirmed this number, showing that this is a persistent tendency – one in every ten Bulgarians openly 
admits that they would sell their vote despite the fact that this is a criminal offence punishable by law 
(Novinite.com, 2011). 
 
Vote buying is an illegal practice used by representatives of various political actors to convince voters 
to vote for the given party in exchange for money or other material gift. Vote buying is most wide-
spread in societies with low democratic culture and traditions, marked by significant distrust and 
disillusionment with the established political system. The most appropriate targets for vote-buyers are 
marginalized groups (minorities, rural population, uneducated and impoverished people). Vote buying 
works best if the voter turnout is low, as even a small number of purchased votes can secure the 
desired electoral result. The political actors in search of voters usually need to get in touch with “an 
unofficial community leader.” The Roma ghettoes in Bulgarian cities usually have a very strict 
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hierarchical arrangement, with a few wealthy “businessmen” (often with criminal background) at the 
top of the pyramid. Once such leader is located, the negotiations start. The leader explains how many 
votes can be secured and names the price (anything from 10 to 100 EUR per vote plus the personal fee 
of few thousand EUR). The leader makes sure that his “subordinates” vote properly by placing trusted 
“observers” in the local electoral commission, although control in usually unnecessary as the people 
selling their votes are neither interested in the politics nor actually aware who they vote for (for a very 
good and detailed article describing how undercover journalists posing as members of a non-existing 
political party successfully purchased votes in a Roma-populated Stolipinovo Quarter in the city of 
Plovdiv, see Dikov, 2009).  
 
The reasons why the willingness to participate in the vote buying is much more common among the 
Roma community are complex, but are overall connected to their exceptionally low social-economic 
status and deep marginalisation. The political parties from left, right and centre usually remember the 
Roma community only during the pre-election periods and Roma are aware that these are not just the 
only opportunities to have access to political figures or their representatives, but also the only chance 
to get some practical benefits (like financial or other gifts) from the politicians. In turn, despite their 
countless declarations to the contrary, most political parties through their behaviour and actions on 
every election seem to support the established model of attracting the Roma voters only through 
offering them (legal or illegal) gifts and similar incentives. Almost no political party has tried to win 
the Roma votes through concrete political platforms for improvement of the Roma situation, inclusion 
of Roma candidates on the electable positions on candidate lists, or including Roma on important 
positions in central or local governments. Since 1989, each parliamentary assembly included only one 
Roma MP, with the exception of 2001-2005 period, when there were two Roma in the Parliament.  
 
In the prelude to the 2011 local elections, various steps were taken to prevent or limit the practice of 
vote buying. Some were directly aimed at Roma voters and although they do not violate the 
legislation, their legitimacy can be seriously questioned. It is also very obvious that such measures 
have a discriminatory character and are an infringement of the rights of the Roma citizens.  
 
In the Kyustendil municipality, the mayor Peter Paunov refused to set up voting sections inside the 
Roma neighbourhood. On the previous elections, usually 6 sections accommodating about 5500 Roma 
voters operated in the neighbourhood. Under the pretext that such a measure would remove the 
preconditions for the controlled vote, pressure and vote buying, Roma voters were “transferred” to the 
voters’ lists at voting sections in other parts of the town, causing considerable inconvenience to some 
and discouraging others from participation on the elections. According to mayor Paunov, his model 
should be applied on the national level on the next elections (Obretenov, 2011). According to the 
legislation, voting sections are established by the municipality mayors within the territory of the 
municipality not later than 55 days in advance of the election day (Article 71 (2) of the Election 
Code). According to an expert working for the regional administration, such arrangement can only 
intensify the negative predispositions towards Roma. The political actors, who are actually responsible 
for the vote buying are not sanctioned in any way, while the Roma are punished by having their voting 
rights restricted (Hristov, 2011) 
4. 3. The media analysis 
 
The media carry a large share of responsibility for the prevailingly negative attitude towards Roma.  
According to a research of the Institute of Modern Politics, which studied publications in five 
Bulgarian daily newspapers in the five months period, from 743 articles on Roma issues, only 15 
displayed a positive attitude towards Roma. The issue of vote buying and its link to the Roma was 
included in 4% of these articles (Panev, 2012).  
  
The daily Trud published 31 articles on vote buying in October-November 2011 (roughly a month 
before and after the 2011 presidential and local elections). More than half of the articles (19) were 
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about concrete cases of vote buying (in numerous articles, more than one case was described). The 
articles gave the initials and in some cases full names of people who were arrested for involvement in 
vote buying. In numerous cases, the arrested individuals were promptly put on trial and sentenced. 
Eight articles analysed the problems and irregularities that occurred during the elections, including 
vote buying. Several of these articles explained in detail how the vote buying schemes operate. Four 
articles presented views and reactions of relevant political actors.   
 
Roma were mentioned in 9 articles – most often as people selling their votes. In three articles, Roma 
criminal bosses or Roma “informal leaders” (usually a local loan shark) were described as people the 
corrupt political actors turned to in order to purchase Roma votes. It is interesting to note that most 
articles used language close to ironic to describe the cases of Roma vote trade. Rather than presenting 
the phenomenon as a harmful social pathology, articles took delight in absurdity of most cases.8 One 
article even went as far as to propose that the vote trade should be legalised, as it became more than 
obvious that it cannot be prevented. 
   
Ironic side of the articles aside, the newspaper reporting on vote buying confirmed that this practice is 
still exceptionally widespread and damaging. A very concerning tendency is that newly established 
political parties readily accept vote buying and other election irregularities as a normal part of the 
political game. Furthermore, it seems that in their aspiration to compete with or defeat the established 
political parties, the new political actors exploit the illegal and illegitimate way to secure votes even 
more arrogantly and without any constraints. In this way, this malicious practice will continue to 
spread in the coming years. Painfully aware of the situation, the majority of the Bulgarian voters are 
becoming increasingly disillusioned and disappointed over the state of the Bulgarian political system 
and prefer not to vote at all, which is playing straight into the hands of the corrupt and dishonest 
economic-political actors. The lesser the turnout on the election day, less votes have to be bought to 
turn the elections in the desired direction. 
 
4. 4. Fieldwork analysis – views of the respondents 
4. 4. 1. Dispositions towards Roma and their political participation 
 
All ethnic communities in Bulgaria have substantial and persistent prejudice against Roma. The main 
negative stereotypes are that they are criminals, do not respect laws and social norms, do not want to 
work and improve their situation, and that they cannot be integrated into the society. Two of our 
respondents, who have been involved in the political campaigning on the national level said that the 
most immense challenge they encountered in their conversations with voters across the country was to 
overcome the exceptional negativism and prejudice against Roma (A-WP4-2, A-WP4-3).  
 
The majority population is troubled by the growing fear fuelled by the media that the number of Roma 
was steadily rising, as were their illiteracy, marginalisation and ghettoisation. A respondent pointed 
out that these fears are a logical consequence of extremely one-sided public image of the Roma 
community, which is a consequence of unbalanced and sensationalistic media reporting. 
“Our society lacks a positive image of an integrated Roma person. And there are numerous 
interesting and telling examples the society just does not know about. What dominates the 
media is a negative image – a villain of Roma origin. And there are many Roma who have 
achieved something with honest work and with their abilities.” – A-WP4-1 
                                                     
8
 For example, a 75 year old man was arrested by the police for giving 10 EUR to each person in his village who promised to 
vote for the designated candiate for the mayor. The aged vote buyer was sentenced to 150 hours of publically-beneficial 
labour (cleaning of the streets). In another case, a person was fined with 250 EUR for bribing two people to vote for his 
father by providing them free firewood for the coming winter.  
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One of our respondents is a well educated Roma man from a small village. He was invited to become a 
member of the ruling GERB party and actively participated in the pre-election campaign in the region. 
His personal expectation was that the party would nominate him as a candidate for the municipal 
council, only to learn with deep bitterness that despite the promises, he was not included in the 
candidate list (A-WP4-7). 
 
This is a very telling illustration of the problem of the Roma political participation. Most political 
parties are reluctant to raise Roma candidates for the National Assembly or for the municipal councils. 
Instead, they prefer to secure the Roma votes through informal channels. The political actors usually 
offer stereotypical excuses that no Roma candidates have the needed education and experience. 
However, the practice shows that even when such people are available, they are neglected and 
rejected.  
 
Respondents are very critical about all political parties and believe than none of them is truly 
interested in the fate of the minorities. They suspect that most parties simply want to manipulate and 
exploit minority groups for their own different purposes. Those respondents, who are politically and 
socially active, leave little room for doubt in their opinions: 
“There is no political force with such a programme. Even if they have something written down 
on paper, they have no intention of respecting it. Because of the way the entire political 
situation is constructed in Bulgaria, each political force has a certain interest to manipulate 
and use minorities.” – A-WP4-4 
“In my opinion there is no political party with a clear programme for integration of 
minorities.” – A-WP4-1 
 
The comments about the political representation of Roma are similar.  
“I believe that minorities should have their own representatives on all levels (local, regional 
and central) of government and in all political parties. In municipalities, in the national 
parliament, in all institutions. Now we still see that certain state institutions are closed for the 
minorities.” – A-WP4-3 
 
Despite the predominant liberal and tolerant general opinion that minorities should be politically 
represented in all branches of state power, respondents are very sceptical that this can realistically be 
achieved. Allowing for the possibility that in near future such development indeed takes place, many 
respondents wonder how effective would such political participation be. What lies at the bottom of 
such scepticism are again the entrenched stereotypes and suspicions that people of minority origin 
(Roma in particular) with necessary qualities and integrity are in a short supply. 
“Quotas, the actual opening of political space for such people, will not automatically lead to 
improvement of the situation of the minorities.” – A-WP4-4 
“Minorities in the government of the state... if we speak about Roma, I think they are not 
represented enough. But, if we let more Roma... well it depends on them. Depends on the 
individual person – what they want to achieve and why.” – A-WP4-5 
 
The issue about the political representation of Roma is thus considered as a problem, but not a very 
significant one, judging from the very limited and general opinions respondents have shared when 
asked to comment on it. They see it as one of the potential steps for the improvement of the situation 
of Roma, but have no clear opinion about the concrete steps that need to be taken.  
 
Additional factor complicating the discussion about Roma and the voting process is the general 
distrust in the state institutions and the political class. Bulgarians are remarkably critical in their 
evaluation of the legitimacy of the state institutions and do not trust the government, the Parliament, 
the political parties and the judiciary (see European Commission, 2009, p. 20). For this reason, the 
topics like election frauds and voting manipulation are discussed with noticeable resignation. If 
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anything has surprised them, than it was the sheer scale and unscrupulousness of irregularities on 
October 2011 elections. Most politicians (with a notable exception of the winning GERB party), media 
and society have united behind an opinion that the recent elections were the most flawed elections in 
the recent Bulgarian history. The signals and complaints about foul election play were countless. The 
results of the public opinion poll show that only a quarter of the population believes that the elections 
were conducted fairly and democratically. 
 
Which opinion about the October elections is closer to your opinion? In % 
Opinion All Bulgarians Turks Roma Pomaks 
Elections were fair and 
democratic 24 25 20 26 8 
Elections were not fair 
and democratic 36 36 34 27 52 
I cannot say 34 32 42 40 28 
Refused to answer 7 7 3 8 12 
 
Source: Institute “Ivan Hadjiyski,” Gallup International. December 2011. National inquiry, 1009 
respondents aged over 18. 
4. 4. 2. Vote buying and Roma 
 
In the context of our research, we have focused most of the questions related to dispositions towards 
Roma on the issue of vote buying. In the media and in the public perceptions, vote buying is most 
often attributed to Roma, who are therefore accused that they influence the election results in an illegal 
and illegitimate way. According to most of our respondents, however, this practice is not limited to 
Roma anymore, if it ever was. 
“The practice of vote buying is spreading not just among Roma, but among everyone. The 
people with suitcases (with money) are everywhere.” – A-WP4-8 
“There was vote buying – not just among the minorities and especially Roma. This time there 
was vote buying among Turks, Roma, Bulgarians. Unfortunately, everyone has sold their 
vote.” – A-WP4-2 
 
One respondent tried to explain why so many Roma participate in the vote buying schemes, noting 
that the extreme poverty and difficult circumstances in which they live leave them little choice. 
“Nobody pays any attention to them, only for a moment, when they want their vote to win the 
elections. After that it is again as if they don’t exist. So they will always sell their vote. For a 
meal, for beer, for 20 leva, 50 leva... They will give their vote because they live day for a day. 
There is also a lot of pressure on them.” – A-WP4-11 
 
Interesting observation from the interviews is that most respondents are to such an extent used to the 
widespread practice of vote buying that they do not find the topic overly interesting and their answers 
are not particularly insightful. Most respondents preferred to give general opinions about the problems 
related with Roma marginalisation and the dispositions of the majority population towards Roma. 
“We, the majority, are responsible for what Roma are doing. We spoiled them. We didn’t 
teach them to share our responsibilities and obligations, even towards their own children. It is 
true that the national psychology also plays a role, but we have helped them to abuse the 
state.” – A-WP4-9 
“They can integrate, but only if we also change our way of thinking.” – A-WP4-10 
 
As already mentioned, most respondents tried to explain the Roma situation by defining the main 
problems – low level of education and bad economic situation. 
“In my opinion, education is the key problem. Only education can bring the next generations 
of Roma into a position, where they could fully integrate into the society. The social inequality 
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is also a fundamental problem. The differences in the standard of living between the majority 
and the main ethnic minorities are shocking.” – A-WP4-1 
“The real interest of these minorities is to have an equal access to education and prosperity – 
just like all other citizens. The political parties which claim to protect their interests are 
actually doing everything to keep them not educated, illiterate and without livelihood. In this 
way, the minorities are dependent on these political parties.” – A-WP4-4 
 
Such opinions are quite typical for the Bulgarian society. Roma are stigmatised as poor and illiterate. 
While most people consider that this is a significant problem, few have any clear ideas about how this 
could be changed. The public debate and the attitudes towards Roma are concentrated on the issue of 
their integration. This discourse is dominated by an explicitly patronising tone, where Roma are not 
considered as an equal community with an unalienable right to manage its own affairs, but as a social 
problem the Bulgarian society has to “take care of.” In this sense, even the declarative tolerant attitude 
towards Roma is in fact a very intolerant one in its essence. Blaming the Roma and the alleged 
widespread Roma vote selling for all the deformities and faults of the Bulgarian political system is just 




5. Conclusion  
   
The research into the issue of minority voting rights and their political representation has shown that 
this is among the most contentious problems in the relations between the majority and the minorities. 
The election periods are highly volatile occasions when confrontations and antagonisms based on 
ethnic, religious and cultural differences are mobilised and brought to the fore by different political 
formations that expect to profit from such developments. The fact that similar tactics usually pay off 
shows that despite the seemingly calm and idyllic ethno-religious relations in Bulgaria between the 
election turmoils, the potential for inter-ethnic strife and tension in the country is not negligible. As 
long as the threats and even the fabricated accusations and examples can mobilize the ethno-religious 
factor to win the elections, we cannot speak about the real tolerance and acceptance of different 
communities in Bulgaria.   
 
The current research has again highlighted the significant discrepancy between the official political 
and public discourse on perception and application of democratic norms and values, which are 
characteristic for the majority of EU countries, and the real situation in the country. While the public 
speech is focused on notions of tolerance and acceptance, the concrete examples and everyday 
practices testify about entrenched intolerance that can be easily mobilised in the critical moments like 
political, social and economic crisis.  
 
Despite the fact that the central government periodically comes up with different programmes and 
strategies for integration of minorities, the practical implementation is either lacking or is flawed and 
inadequate. The research has shown that the regional solutions tailored to the ethnic, cultural and 
religious structure of the population on the local level can be far more successful than the solutions 
proposed on the national level. Numerous small towns and villages with ethnically and religiously 
diverse population provide good examples and practices of balanced and stable cohabitation. The 
largest problem is to find a way to transfer the functioning everyday tolerance from the local level into 
the national context, which continues to be dominated by intolerant stereotypes and prejudices. As a 
result, despite the long history of diverse ethnic and religious structure of the Bulgarian state, the 
traditional mechanisms of coexistence did not lead to acceptance of otherness, but merely to parallel 
coexistence.  
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Our recommendation to the policy-makers is to employ the potential existing on the local level and 
institutionalise it. The local authorities ought to be given a very active role in this process. At the 
moment, the central government is exercising a much too strong and tight control over the local 
governments. A larger regional and municipal autonomy to address the needs and problems of the 
local population according to its specific features would be a positive step in turning the unsuccessful 
top-down approach into a more appropriate two-way process. Like in numerous other spheres in 
Bulgaria, this process would benefit tremendously if monitored (and financially supported) by the 
European Commission.  
 
The research has also established that many people are either ignorant of or tend to disregard the 
numerous problems that could provoke or intensify tensions between different ethnic, cultural and 
religious groups. Forming and changing the collective matrix is a long and contradictory process. The 
humanities and especially interdisciplinary studies can play a very valuable role here. Our 
recommendation is therefore to intensify the research of inter-ethnic relations – not just in Bulgarian 
context, but also in the European one. The disclosure of good practices and popularisation of results 
from similar studies increase the sensitivity of the society for such topics. They also stimulate the 
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Annex 1: The Interview Guide 
 
1. Do you know about the new Election Code? What do you think about it – especially about the 
changes restricting the voting rights of people with dual citizenship and the residence principle – 
namely the obligation to permanently reside in a given municipality six months prior to the 
election day? 
2. What was the influence of the new Code on the recent elections? Do you think that the elections 
were conducted correctly, especially regarding the participation of minorities? 
3. Did you vote on these elections?  
4. Were the ethnic and religious minorities represented well enough in the election programme of the 
party you voted for? Is this an important issue for you? 
5. Does the political party you sympathise with have a programme for integration of minorities? 
How do you see the relations between different ethnic and religious groups in the political life in 
Bulgaria? 
6. What would be your recommendations for improvement of policies towards minorities, and for 
improving their political representation (especially of the Roma)? Would you support the idea of 
including Roma, Turks, Pomaks on the candidate lists for municipal councils and mayors on the 
positions where they could realistically be elected? 
7. Do you believe that if more Roma were represented in the municipal councils, or if more Roma 
were mayors, this would help their integration into the society and would improve the inter-ethnic 
cohabitation in your village / town / municipality? 
8. What is your opinion about the vote buying? Have you witnessed such cases? Did anyone try to 
manipulate your vote? 
9. What do you think about cases like Kyustendil municipality, where the mayor prohibited voting 
sections in the Roma neighbourhood with the explanation that this would limit the vote buying and 
the controlled voting? Is this the practice that should be used? 
10. Have you witnessed any other irregularities in the voting section where you voted? 
11. Should the people with dual citizenship who live abroad have the same voting rights as those who 
live permanently in Bulgaria? Are you familiar with arrangements in other countries? If this right 
is restricted – would this constitute a violation of the Constitution? Or international laws? 
12. How would you evaluate the current relations between different ethnic and religious communities 
in your municipality, town and in the country? Do you feel that the negative tendencies like 




Annex 2: profile of the respondents 
Code 
Place of residence Origin M/F Position Remarks 
A-
WP4-1 
Sofia Bulgarian M Professor in sociology, well-known 
political analyst, left-wing 
The respondent preferred to answer to the questionnaire in a 
written form  
A-
WP4-2 
Sofia Turkish M MP since 1997 One of the most influential figures in the MRF, expelled from 
the party in 2011 
A-
WP4-3 




Sofia Bulgarian M Lawyer  
A-
WP4-5 
Central Bulgaria, village with 
predominately Roma population  
Bulgarian M Former village mayor  Mayor for 4 years, ran a campaign in the 2011 local election, 
was not successful  
A-
WP4-6 
Central Bulgaria, village with 
predominately Roma population  
Bulgarian F Director of a kindergarten  Member of the Municipal Council from GERB 
A-
WP4-7 
Central Bulgaria, village with 
predominately Roma population 
Roma M Owner of a small coffee shop Member of GERB, engaged in the election campaign, expected 
to be nominated for Municipal Council but was not 
A-
WP4-8 
Eastern Bulgaria, town with 
predominately Turkish population  
Bulgarian M Former village mayor  
(3 terms) 
Not a member of a political party, ran for a mayor in 2011 
elections and lost 
A-
WP4-9 
Eastern Bulgaria, town with 
predominately Turkish population 
Bulgarian F Teacher in secondary school  
A-
WP4-10 
Eastern Bulgaria, town with 
predominately Turkish population 
Turkish F Administrative secretary of a village 
mayor 
Worked with the previous mayor and still holds the position 
A-
WP4-11 
Eastern Bulgaria, village with 
predominately Turkish population 
Turkish M Construction worker  
A-
WP4-12 
Southern Bulgaria, village with 




M Municipality mayor (4 terms) Twice elected with the support of MRF, twice elected as 
independent candidate; Won the elections in 2011 
A-
WP4-13 
Southern Bulgaria, village with 




M Rentier, Former mine worker  
A-
WP4-14 
Southern Bulgaria, village with 
predominately Muslim Bulgarian 
population 
Bulgarian M Former mine worker  
 
